Air defence remains the best method to protect Ukraine’s critical energy and civilian infrastructure. However, there are other steps that can be taken to increase Ukraine’s energy security ahead of and during the coming winter. The IEA proposes six key actions for Ukraine and its partners to help address ongoing energy security challenges.

Strengthening the security of critical energy infrastructure across Ukraine is vital to maintaining capacity this winter. A multilayered defence strategy, whereby air defence is combined with passive defence measures, can serve as a strong means of protecting key energy facilities. Ukraine has been investing in lighter passive defence – such as gabions and sandbags, as well as anti-drone netting – as well as a second level of protection whereby reinforced concrete structures are erected around important infrastructure such as substations and autotransformers. These measures, combined with air defence, have successfully repelled some recent attacks. However, further investment remains necessary as Russia continues to update its attack strategies and increase the number of drones and missiles deployed.

Efforts to optimise supply chains for key energy equipment also remain crucial, as regular attacks increase the need for frequent repairs and repurposed parts tend to wear down faster. The logistics around commissioning and shipping crucial spare parts, vehicles and equipment remain cumbersome due to administrative and regulatory bottlenecks, equipment compatibility issues and funding gaps. Given the ongoing importance of importing and delivering spare parts, Ukraine should continue assessing which materials already in the country could be repurposed, while working closely with international partners – such as the Energy Community's Energy Support Fund and the  G7+ Energy Coordination Group, to speed up deliveries and sourcing. Adjusting funding mechanisms to cover not only equipment, but also delivery, installation and technical adaptation, would also close key gaps. 

Additionally, accumulating stocks of spare parts and vehicles would allow Ukraine to flexibly respond to shifting attack patterns. Strategic stockpiles, both in Ukraine and neighbouring countries, could expedite the delivery of emergency equipment while ensuring that not all stockpiles could be targeted. Finally, stronger coordination between Ukraine’s energy sector stakeholders and the State Customs Service to anticipate new equipment imports and adjust regulations – particularly for dual-use energy equipment – would allow them to reach their destinations sooner.

It is more complicated and costlier for Russia to target and attack wind turbines and small gas plants, for example, than larger, more centralised power plants. As a result, continuing to decentralise the power system and add distributed generation strengthens Ukraine’s energy security and makes the grid more resilient to attacks. This is laid out in the IEA’s roadmap, Empowering Ukraine through a Decentralised Energy System, which highlights the vital role of distributed energy resources in addressing the country’s power deficit while also enhancing the resilience and flexibility of its energy systems.

Over the past year, businesses and households have continued to add distributed gas generation, large-scale diesel generators and solar PV capacity, reflecting a consistent shift towards decentralised energy as a tool to enable stable energy supplies. Meanwhile, batteries and energy storage systems are playing an increasingly crucial role in strengthening Ukraine's energy security, particularly during emergencies and grid disruptions.

Speeding up the pace of private sector investment in distributed energy resources, including batteries, would help Ukraine further diversify its power mix and quickly increase system resilience. Mechanisms such as the state-owned Export and Investment Fund of Denmark (EIFO), which backs the DTEK Tyligulska Wind Farm; the EBRD; and the European Commission's Ukraine Renewable Energy Risk Mitigation Mechanism can play a significant role in supporting Ukraine's energy sector, enabling urgently needed investment in critical infrastructure and making large-scale distributed energy projects bankable by helping to reduce risks.

Since Ukraine’s synchronisation with the European grid in March 2022, cross-border capacity for electricity trade has steadily expanded, while the shift to a weekly recalculation since June 2025 has improved flexibility in the range of several hundreds of megawatts. This has allowed TSOs to respond to real-time system conditions and maximise opportunities both for imports during peak demand and exports when generation is sufficient.

Even so, realistic options to increase interconnection capacity beyond current levels appear limited in the near-term. Cross-border transmission capacities are constrained by grid congestion in both Ukraine and neighbouring EU countries. In the short-term, the focus should be on maximising the use of existing infrastructure, continuing regulatory improvements to optimise capacity calculations, and complementing grid connections with distributed solutions to improve resilience during periods of peak demand. At the same time, both Ukraine and its European partners should work together to address bottlenecks in their respective transmission networks to unlock additional cross-border capacity. Accelerating grid infrastructure projects throughout the region will be critical for the next several years and beneficial for further integration.

Meanwhile, power sector stakeholders must signal to Ukraine's partners, as well as to investors, that regulatory stability, transparency and strong corporate governance remain priorities despite the acute challenges of ongoing Russian attacks. Maintaining and strengthening corporate governance for Ukraine's energy companies in accordance with OECD and EU standards will allow for both predictability and cooperation, two pillars for tackling energy security challenges.

Additional steps can be taken to ensure Ukraine will be able to fully meet its winter gas demand needs, thereby safeguarding energy security. Further increasing the volume of gas stored would help prevent winter supply crunches. Fortifying critical gas infrastructure is also crucial for ensuring stable supplies throughout the winter. While Ukraine’s vast underground facilities are resilient, above-ground assets such as compressors remain exposed. Meanwhile, turning to multiple suppliers and utilising varied import routes, such as the Vertical Corridor and the Lithuania-Poland gas interconnectors, would reduce risks, including from damaged infrastructure. Prioritising the reinforcement of key heating infrastructure and encouraging local backup systems would also help maintain supply during disruptions.

The large storage capacity Ukraine has today presents opportunities as well. These can be maximised by buying gas when prices are low and avoiding rigid storage targets, while managing price risks with hedging and long-term contracts. Securing deals with countries and traders to store more gas in Ukraine would also help improve the stability of the storage system, while ensuring that volumes are accessible and available for purchase should Ukraine need them. If Ukraine's partners can work together to reduce the risk premium associated with storage, this could boost uptake and help Ukraine manage future winter supply uncertainty. From reinforcing infrastructure to purchasing gas for storage, ongoing international funding from Ukraine’s partners will be crucial.

Meanwhile, efficiency measures can simultaneously help manage gas demand, along with robust contingency planning that ensures energy priorities are met during demand peaks or in the event of supply shortages.

Making sure citizens have backup options for winter heating is of utmost importance, particularly in the east, where attacks have been concentrated, and rural areas. Alongside smaller combined heat and power units, liquid petroleum gas heaters, wood and coal stoves – and backup fuel supplies for them – are key. A colder-than-average winter combined with further attacks would exacerbate underlying weaknesses in Ukraine’s district heating network, such as aging infrastructure and rising inefficiency.  

Decentralisation also has a strong role to play in heating. Households and businesses have started installing biomass boilers and heat pumps, particularly in smaller towns. Combined with municipal-level cogeneration units, which can be used for both backup electricity as well as heat, towns and cities can strengthen the resilience of their systems and reduce their dependence on bigger thermal power plants that remain vulnerable to Russian attacks.

Ukraine’s energy system faces challenges year-round, but winter brings increased vulnerabilities. As the government and energy companies work hard to protect, maintain and repair access to energy, Ukraine’s partners should endeavour to streamline coordination efforts and make sure Ukraine has the support it needs to carry out the recommendations above. International financial institutions, partner governments, non-governmental organisations and industry stakeholders will need to work together closely to address both the immediate risks and medium-term challenges that Ukraine faces across the electricity, gas and heating sectors.

This winter is likely to be a difficult one, and Ukraine will need to utilise every possible means of keeping power and heating accessible for its citizens. These actions are underway, but in order to further reduce underlying risks and strengthen resilience, Ukraine and its partners must continue to proactively monitor the situation, rapidly assess changing needs and be ready to act quickly as needed.