As Ukraine enters its fourth winter of the war, energy infrastructure continues to be targeted by Russian attacks. Ukraine’s natural gas and power infrastructure remain vulnerable, with an increasing number of missiles and drones striking critical plants and pipelines. At the same time, evolving tactics and technologies are present a persistent challenge for Ukraine’s air and passive defences.

Energy security is central to Ukraine’s overall security. Ensuring that Ukrainian citizens retain access to heat and power is of the utmost importance, especially during the cold winter months. While Ukraine has made strong strides in rebuilding and strengthening the resilience of its energy system this past spring and summer, the situation remains fragile, and the risk of huge disruptions and widespread destabilisation remains – particularly if Russia further intensifies targeted attacks or temperatures in the months ahead are colder than expected.

This analysis builds on the IEA’s September 2024 report, Ukraine’s Energy Security and the Coming Winter. It provides an update on the latest developments through October 2025 and proposes key actions that Ukraine and its partners can take to address urgent energy security vulnerabilities this winter and bolster longer-term energy resilience.

Since the end of the last heating season, Ukraine has extensively worked to restore damaged power system infrastructure while adding further distributed generation and battery storage capacity.

Before 2022, Ukraine’s available dispatchable power generation capacity was roughly 38 gigawatts (GW). Losses in the first year of war due to occupation, destruction and/or damage amounted to 19 GW, and after additional concentrated attacks in spring 2024, capacity declined to just 12 GW. Ahead of the 2024/2025 winter, Ukraine was able to restore 3 GW, and it has continued to repair and add additional capacity throughout the past year.

The country's electricity mix remains highly dependent on the three remaining operational nuclear power plants located in western and central Ukraine. Together, they account for 50%, or 7.7 GW, of the country’s electricity generation capacity.

Ukraine’s electricity security continues to benefit from the sector’s interconnection with the European grid following its synchronisation in March 2022. This integration has proven vital, enabling imports during peak demand periods while allowing exports that help stabilise Ukraine’s grid and generate revenues when domestic generation is sufficient. In 2024, Ukraine imported a record 4 436 gigawatt-hours (GWh) of electricity, reflecting the extensive damage to its domestic generation capacity. In the first nine months of 2025, import levels declined as generation capacity gradually recovered, and Ukraine became a net electricity exporter between June and September – sending 635 GWh abroad in September alone, the highest monthly level since the full-scale invasion began. However, this trend is beginning to change with the increasing number and intensity of Russia attacks, with Ukraine relying more heavily on imports for much of October.

Over the past year, progress has been made in expanding cross-border capacity for electricity trade. Since December 2024, firm import capacity has been set at 2.1 GW during winter months and 1.7 GW in the summer, while export capacity increased from 550 MW to 650 MW. The available trade capacities are now recalculated weekly by the six regional transmission system operators, providing greater flexibility to respond to system conditions and maximise available capacity. However, further expansion remains constrained by grid congestion in both Ukraine and neighbouring EU countries. Additionally, there is a risk that interconnections may not deliver power to those most in need, with Russian attacks on energy infrastructure increasingly splitting well-supplied western regions from those in the east near the frontlines, which often have electricity deficits.

Ukraine has also managed to add large-scale energy storage capacity over the past year. DTEK, Ukraine’s largest private sector energy firm, launched the country's first energy storage system complex in September 2025, with a capacity of 200 megawatts (MW) and a total storage of 400 megawatt-hours (MWh). Under the project, there are six facilities across the country, together capable of powering 600 000 homes for two hours. This will enhance electricity security and system balancing. Wind energy projects are also moving forward; more than 700 MW of new capacity are currently under development, including DTEK’s nearly 400 MW Tyligulska Wind Farm expansion on the Black Sea coast, which is scheduled to go online in late 2026.

Going into October 2025, Ukraine’s Ministry of Energy had anticipated that 17.6 GW of total generation capacity would be available ahead of this heating season. While the winter of 2023/2024 saw peak demand reach 18 GW, demand fell to 16.5 GW during the 2024/2025 heating season, driven mainly by milder temperatures. However, a colder-than-average winter could see demand rise to 18 GW or more.

The situation is also constantly changing as Russian attacks on power infrastructure continue, despite the institution of a pause on strikes against energy infrastructure in the spring. According to Ukraine's Ministry of Energy, the country's power sector saw over 3 100 disruptions due to Russian aggression between March and September 2025.

Attacks have recently ramped up, in line with what has become a seasonal pattern. On 7-8 September 2025, Russia conducted its largest-ever air attack on Ukraine since the beginning of its full-scale invasion in February 2022, significantly impacting  energy infrastructure. During that attack, 19 drones severely damaged the recently rebuilt Trypilska Therman Power Plant, which had initially been destroyed in spring 2024. Russia continued to escalate its drone campaign against energy infrastructure throughout September – deploying almost 6 900 drones, a substantial increase from  2024 levels. On 10 October 2025, another massive attack by Russia targeted energy infrastructure across Ukraine, causing serious damage to several thermal power plants in Kyiv and leaving 800 000 residents without power.

Natural gas plays an important role in ensuring heat and electricity supply security in Ukraine, and gas-fired power plants are an important provider of flexibility for the power system. As with the power sector, natural gas infrastructure has been widely damaged by missile and drone attacks.

In early 2025, the country’s gas sector was heavily targeted, resulting in a 40% loss in production, temporary shutdowns and the need for higher gas imports to cover demand for the upcoming heating season. Storage levels were already low compared with recent years (in April 2025, they were 80% lower than in 2024). Going into the summer, Naftogaz – Ukraine’s national oil and natural gas company – announced a 2025 storage target of 13.2 billion cubic metres (bcm). That was up from 12.8 bcm in 2024 and put its import needs at a minimum of 4.6 bcm.

Between April and September 2025, net storage injections surged by 70%. This strong increase brought Ukraine’s gas storage levels (including buffer gas) very close to the target, with 13 bcm of gas injected into storage as of 16 October 2025.  Most volumes came from Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, but Ukraine also began to look to imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) from the United States as another option. About 400 million cubic metres (mcm) of US LNG was shipped by September via Lithuania and Poland, with further volumes planned by the end of 2025.

In order to purchase this gas, Ukraine has had to rely on loans and grants, including an EUR 500 million loan from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), backed by the European Commission; an EUR 300 million loan from the European Investment Bank (EIB); and a grant of EUR 83 million from Norway.

Ukraine was able to use the spring and summer as an opportunity to fully recover production capacity. Then, on 3-4 October 2025, Russia carried out its biggest attack on Ukraine's gas infrastructure since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, severely damaging production facilities in the Kharkiv and Poltava regions. According to government sources, almost 60% of gas production is currently offline as a result. Another attack on 16 October further damaged gas production in eastern Ukraine, as well as a gas processing plant. Naftogaz was able to quickly secure a EUR 62 million loan from Ukraine’s Oschadbank for further gas imports, and it is in talks with the EBRD and others regarding further loans and grants. However, if Russia continues to attack gas production infrastructure at the same rate, Ukraine may need to increase its reliance on imports, with at least an additional 4.4 bcm needed before March 2026 to get through the current heating season. A colder-than-expected winter could further exacerbate the gas deficit.

Meanwhile, Ukraine’s district heating sector, which relies heavily on natural gas for water heating, also continues to be a major target. By the end of 2024, at least 18 combined heat and power plants, over 800 boiler houses and 354 kilometres of heating pipes had been attacked. As another heating season approaches, Russia has begun to target smaller thermal power plants (TPPs) and combined heat and power plants near the frontlines.