Global energy investment has steadily risen over the past decade and reached over USD 3.3 trillion for the first time in 2025. Clean energy investment trends are especially notable – with investments in a range of clean energy technologies and infrastructure, taken together, accounting for nearly two-thirds of global investments today. However, these headline numbers often mask a persistent trend: a gaping regional imbalance in global energy investment. After removing the share of investment going towards advanced economies and People’s Republic of China (hereafter, “China”), emerging market and developing economies (EMDE) other than China account for around 27% of total energy investment and 18% of clean energy investment. With the bulk of future energy and electricity demand expected to be driven by EMDE, this disparity influences their ability to deliver secure, affordable energy transitions aligned with their development objectives.

From around USD 875 billion today, energy investment in EMDE other than China needs to rise substantially in all scenarios. In the Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario (NZE Scenario), energy investment in these countries, taken together, reaches nearly USD 2 trillion by 2035. Such a substantial scale-up requires taking careful stock of what the available sources of finance are, where they are going, and how they are being utilised to ultimately understand the future course of action.

IEA analysis reveals that much of the financing for energy today in EMDE other than China derives from domestic capital. However, given the limitations of fiscal budgets and domestic markets, it is crucial for EMDE to mobilise international capital. Therefore, international public finance (IPF) – concessional or non-concessional funding coming from development finance institutions (DFIs), multilateral climate funds, export credit agencies, governments and philanthropies often directed to higher-risk regions or nascent technologies – plays a critical role. While the absolute size of their financing is small, making up less than 10% of investment in EMDE other than China, this capital can be allocated to mobilise even more private investment.

China has become a major provider of international public finance. Its outbound financing expanded rapidly in the years leading up to 2010 as part of broader economic and industrial strategies, with the China Development Bank (CDB) and the Export–Import Bank of China (CEXIM) emerging as two of the world’s largest DFIs. The launch of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013 further accelerated this outward push, formalising China’s ambition to strengthen cross-border infrastructure, energy access and economic ties. While China is not a traditional donor represented in fora such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD’s) development assistance committee, its official-sector institutions have become highly active abroad, particularly in energy. Their overseas engagement responds not only to domestic priorities – such as securing supply chains and supporting the global expansion of Chinese developers and equipment manufacturers – but also to strong demand from partner countries for investment that can help advance their own development and transition goals. This combination has positioned China as one of the largest sources of official financing for energy projects in EMDE.

This report builds on previous IEA work by taking a closer look at the composition of China’s outbound energy finance. By identifying the main official-sector institutions and the instruments they use, it provides a clearer view of how Chinese capital is deployed abroad. The next section outlines this institutional architecture.

China’s official financing sector refers to state-owned or state-directed institutions that provide financing or investment abroad in support of national economic, industrial and diplomatic objectives. Although their mandates and operating models differ, these institutions share two features, public ownership and policy alignment, including the support for domestic industrial competitiveness, advancing energy security, increasing international connectivity and promoting low-carbon development pathways in partner countries. In the context of this report, the official financing sector includes five groups of institutions active in outbound energy financing: government agencies, state-owned policy banks, state-owned funds, state-owned commercial banks and state-owned enterprises (SOEs).

Taken together, these institutions span a spectrum from traditional public financiers to more commercially-oriented ones but are still state-directed actors. Government agencies and state-owned policy banks anchor the traditional end, providing grants or debt with clear public policy mandates. State-owned funds, state-owned commercial banks and SOEs sit towards the commercial end, offering a wider mix of instruments – from equity and hybrid capital to guarantees – and often investing directly in project companies or joint ventures. Although these institutions operate with differing degrees of commercial autonomy, they are all publicly owned and strategically aligned, and their overseas activity forms a central pillar of China’s official financial engagement abroad.