Natural gas and low-emissions gases security review

The ASEAN region is set to become a net gas importer by the end of the decade. Natural gas remains an important part of the region’s energy system, with regional consumption close to 180 bcm in 2025. Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand account for around 85% of demand. Gas consumption grew only modestly over the previous decade, but it is projected to rise by 18% between 2025 and 2030, driven by new gas-fired generation capacity and expanding industrial activity. Over the same period, regional gas production, which stood at around 210 bcm in 2025, is projected to decline by around 4% despite new projects in Indonesia and Viet Nam. This combination of rising demand and declining production is steadily eroding the region’s gas surplus and is expected to turn the ASEAN region from a net exporter into a net importer by the end of the decade.

Growing reliance on LNG is leaving the region exposed to supply and price risks. LNG imports into ASEAN member states more than tripled between 2015 and 2025 and are expected to nearly double again by 2030. More than two-thirds of LNG imports to ASEAN member states come from outside the region. Australia and Qatar are the largest suppliers, together accounting for 45% of total LNG imports and 65% of extra-regional imports into ASEAN member states in 2025. Around 45% of the region’s LNG imports were procured through spot markets and short-term contracts, leaving importers exposed to global competition and price volatility, particularly during periods of market stress.

Maritime choke points and infrastructure constraints are key bottlenecks. In 2025, around one-fifth of ASEAN LNG imports passed through the Strait of Hormuz and more than half involved transit through or within the Strait of Malacca. The 2026 conflict in the Middle East and the subsequent disruption of LNG flows through the Strait of Hormuz demonstrated the risks associated with critical maritime choke points. ASEAN importers saw LNG deliveries via the strait decline by around 75% in the first eight months of 2026, forcing affected importers to secure replacement cargoes from the spot market and exposing them to higher LNG procurement costs. LNG regasification capacity could also become a bottleneck. In 2025, the region had more than 80 bcm/yr of import capacity and imports of just under 40 bcm, but imports could approach 80 bcm by 2030. More than 25 bcm/yr of new regasification capacity is under construction, but utilisation could still reach around 80-90% in several markets, potentially requiring additional investment, balanced against demand uncertainty and the risk of overbuilding.

Storage and cross-border interconnectivity remain limited. The region has just over 3 bcm of LNG storage, equivalent to less than 2% of annual gas consumption, and no operating or planned underground gas storage facilities. Existing LNG storage mainly serves operational rather than strategic purposes. Singapore is a notable exception, operating a Standby LNG Facility that maintains physical buffer stocks for electricity generation during disruptions or severe market stress. Cross-border pipeline interconnectivity is similarly limited and concentrated in Singapore. Progress towards an integrated regional gas pipeline network has been slower than originally envisaged. The flagship Trans-ASEAN Gas Pipeline initiative now places greater emphasis on LNG terminals, reloading, break-bulk operations, small-scale LNG and “virtual pipelines”, which could offer a more flexible and commercially viable pathway to regional connectivity.

Demand-side flexibility exists in some countries, but options are highly uneven across ASEAN member states. Residential and commercial gas consumption is negligible in the region, leaving little scope for emergency curtailment designed to protect households. Industrial interruptibility could provide flexibility in some markets, but the greatest potential lies in the power generation sector, including through fuel switching and dual-fuel capability. However, several power systems in the region lack sufficient substitution options. Singapore and Thailand, for example, have little alternative dispatchable generation, while Malaysia’s coal fleet already operates at high utilisation and geographic constraints or high coal-plant utilisation restrict practical fuel switching in Indonesia, the Philippines and Viet Nam.

Infrastructure reliability and climate resilience are emerging as key dimensions of gas security. Ageing upstream infrastructure, pipeline and LNG assets have contributed to unplanned outages, including repeated failures affecting Malaysia’s Sabah-Sarawak Gas Pipeline. Gas infrastructure and gas-fired power plants are also exposed to flooding, extreme heat, drought and tropical cyclones. Nearly a quarter of existing and under-construction gas-fired capacity is located on river floodplains, while more than 30% faces extreme heat for at least 40 days a year. Tropical cyclones pose additional risks, notably in Myanmar, the Philippines and Viet Nam, and can also disrupt LNG exports from Australia. These risks underscore the importance of strengthening the resilience of both domestic gas infrastructure and international LNG supply chains.

Low-emissions gases offer longer-term security and decarbonisation benefits but will remain a niche supply source through 2030. ASEAN member states have sustainable biogas and biomethane production potential equivalent to around 65 bcm of natural gas, concentrated in Indonesia, Thailand and Viet Nam. However, current biomethane production is negligible and is unlikely to exceed 1 bcm by 2030 due to infrastructure, policy and economic barriers. Local production for industrial sites, targeted support and improved infrastructure access could accelerate deployment beyond 2030. Low-emissions hydrogen is at an even earlier stage: announced projects are sizeable, but few are under construction, while high costs, limited infrastructure, weak demand and certification challenges are expected to constrain meaningful commercial deployment before 2030.