Priority actions for winter 2026 2027

The actions below are selected for their contribution to one goal: maintaining or quickly restoring supply during attacks and outages this winter. Each can be advanced by Ukrainian authorities with the support of partners. Without effective, timely and innovative resilience measures that are backed by large-scale financing, in addition to adequate air defences, Ukraine risks losing critical infrastructure in the coming months that could take years to rebuild.

Physical protection should continue to be built into every repair and new project: Level 1 includes netting, gabions and sandbags, which protect against debris and drone fragments; Level 2 includes reinforced-concrete structures that are able to withstand direct drone hits. A National Security and Defence Council decision of 31 August requires more backup power, at least two weeks of fuel reserves and stronger engineering protection for critical infrastructure; partners can help by financing standard protection solutions and early-warning systems at key substations. According to the Ministry of Energy, roughly 200 Level 2 protection structures for a variety of energy facilities were installed by the end of August 2026, with a further 280 in progress. Ukrenergo further identified 18 priority substations critical for nuclear generation output, cross-border trade and black-start capability which will be, or already are, equipped with active and passive defence mechanisms. However, given the complexity and cost of retrofitting passive protection, many assets remain partially or fully unprotected. Cyber protection of control centres and market systems deserves the same attention, since major strikes have often been accompanied by cyberattacks.

Strategic stocks of transformers, switchgear and generation units, held in Ukraine and neighbouring countries, shorten repair times. Dispersing them across several sites and standardising specifications would make them more useful and harder to destroy in a single strike. Partners can prioritise items that can be installed quickly or that come with funding for installation, taking into account manufacturing lead times for equipment that is in demand globally.

Ukraine’s energy workforce has carried the system through four winters of attacks, and its capacity now limits how fast equipment can be installed and repaired. Prioritising technicians for critical infrastructure can allow them to be exempted from army duty, while attracting and training new staff, including women for maintenance and service roles, and supporting staff wellbeing are key aspects of winter preparedness. With the severe reduction in industrial capacity from recent attacks, workers could be retrained and deployed to help install and maintain key energy equipment. The list of urgent workforce needs prepared by the Ministry of Energy and the Energy Community Secretariat offers a basis for targeted support. Arrangements agreed in advance to mobilise contractors and specialists from other sectors and regions would add surge capacity for repairs as well as for installing passive defence solutions.

Delivered units should be connected before the peak of winter. Preparing sites in parallel with procurement, by sizing units to the load, completing civil and electrical works and checking network and gas capacity before delivery, removes most delays. Funding for site preparation and installation, now available through the new installation facility, should be used to clear the backlog. Once connected, units need affordable gas and a route to sell their electricity, so that they run when the system needs them and not only as emergency backup. Particularly in energy-deficit and frontline regions, new distributed inverter-based units and batteries should be specified as grid-forming, so that they can keep supply running in island mode when part of the network is cut off.

Batteries and active consumers can reduce the evening peak if rules allow it. Ukrenergo has contracted up to 810 MW of new generation and storage for ancillary services, but rules do not yet let this capacity serve other system needs. The large fleet of batteries installed behind the meter by households and businesses could also support the system at peak. Fast adoption of the draft rules on dynamic tariffs for the 4.1 million households with smart meters, allowing small batteries to sell electricity to the grid, and a communication campaign explaining the benefits would unlock part of this resource. Paying large consumers to reduce demand at specific hours offers more predictable results than curtailment.

With no new physical capacity expected before 2028, gains must come from operations and markets. More granular capacity calculation, such as distinguishing day and night values, and software-based line ratings accounting for ambient weather conditions (wind and temperature) on congested lines could release additional capacity. Price caps should be set at levels high enough to allow imports during scarcity, as was done from January to March 2026. Co-ordination with Moldova and Romania on shared capacity is all the more important given the drought. Making full use of the ENTSO-E emergency assistance framework, which already covers system operators beyond Ukraine’s direct neighbours, would increase support after sudden losses.

Each region should be able to keep critical services running if it is cut off from the rest of the system. Lessons can be learned from frontline region experience, as this requires batteries and inverters able to operate in island mode, tested in selected areas, as well as backup power for heat, water and communications designed for winter conditions: standby generators can lose about 30% of their output at -10°C. Joint winter plans covering electricity, heat, gas and water, agreed between cities and national authorities, with clear roles and a shared picture of network conditions, would allow faster responses and spread good practices such as Kharkiv's. As of mid-October 2026, the implementation of resilience plans for cities and regions in frontline and border regions is outpacing that of Kyiv. Strengthening co-ordination with relevant institutions, establishing clear and consistent governance measures and introducing a systemic approach to resilience planning will allow for faster and more integrated implementation. Timely and predictable disbursement of funds would also help accelerate implementation.

Keeping district heating running is one of the most effective ways of protecting the power system, because every interruption pushes households onto electric heaters at peak. Decentralised cogeneration does both, supplying heat and adding generation close to demand. Backup heating for households and public buildings should avoid electric resistance heating wherever possible. Energy efficiency comes first: radiator controls and bypasses, supported by the July law on district heating modernisation, cut heat demand quickly and cheaply in buildings where occupants now regulate temperature by opening windows. Almost 80% of the housing stock is energy inefficient, and the LED programme, which cut peak demand by up to 1 GW, shows how fast targeted measures can work.